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DISABILITY STIGMA AND INTRACLASS 
DISCRIMINATION 
Jeannette Cox* 
ABSTRACT 
By dramatically enlarging the Americans with Disabilities Act’s 
(ADA) protected class, the recent amendments to the ADA increase the 
opportunities for employers to replace one member of the ADA’s 
protected class with another. Although disparities in the social stigma 
associated with different disabilities suggests that such employment 
decisions are not automatically free from disability-based animus, many 
courts historically regarded such decisions as immune from ADA 
scrutiny. They held that the ADA only prohibited discrimination 
between persons inside and outside the ADA’s protected class. Today, 
this “no intraclass claims” approach persists in a modified form: Some 
courts limit intraclass claims to situations in which employers disfavor 
persons with more biologically severe disabilities vis-à-vis those with 
less biologically severe disabilities. Although this approach benefits 
individuals with more biologically severe disabilities, it compounds the 
disadvantage experienced by persons whose disabilities carry the most 
significant social stigma, a burden that does not directly correlate with 
the biological severity of a person’s disability. This Article argues that 
just as courts’ traditional refusal to permit intraclass disability 
discrimination claims inappropriately obscured the negative social 
responses to disabilities the ADA was designed to address, courts’ 
current emphasis on the biological severity of disabilities departs from 
the ADA’s core purpose: remedying the stigma and stereotypical 
assumptions experienced by individuals with disabilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By dramatically enlarging the Americans with Disabilities Act’s 
(ADA)1 protected class, the recent amendments to the ADA increase the 
opportunities for employers to replace one member of the ADA’s 
protected class with another. Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 (ADAAA),2 the ADA’s protected class encompassed an estimated 
13.5 million individuals, or approximately 4% of the U.S. population.3 
Today, by contrast, the ADA’s protected class includes at least 43 
million persons, or 14% of the U.S. population, though the actual 
number  is likely much higher.4 The previously excluded individuals 
include persons with mild forms of previously included disabilities as 
well as individuals whose relatively severe disabilities can be 
ameliorated with medication.5 Accordingly, the large umbrella of the 
newly amended ADA’s protected class includes individuals with 
disabilities as diverse as diabetes, depression, back pain, deafness, 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 2. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
 3. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 14 (2007) (arguing that prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the ADA left “fewer than 13.5 million Americans protected by the 
ADA—most of whom are unlikely to be able to take advantage of the statute’s employment 
protections”). 
 4. Adopted in 1990, the ADA’s original text noted that 43 million Americans have some 
form of a disability, and that this number will likely increase over time. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(1). The ADAAA removed this provision in order to emphasize that courts should 
regard the 43 million estimate as a floor, not a ceiling, on the number of persons in the ADA’s 
protected class. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3. 
 5. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § (2)(b)(6) (“The purposes of this act are . . . to 
express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise 
that portion of its current regulations that defines the term ‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly 
restricted’ to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.”); id. 
§ 2(b)(2) (“The purposes of this Act are . . . to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that 
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with 
reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures . . . .”). 
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schizophrenia, monocular vision, and missing limbs. It also includes 
people who do not actually have a disability but whom a defendant-
employer perceives to have a disability.6 
The social barriers experienced by the members of the ADA’s 
protected class vary widely. For example, while a missing limb may 
appear to be a more biologically severe disability than depression, a 
person with depression may experience greater social and vocational 
obstacles in the modern workplace, which often emphasizes a positive 
outlook.7 Similarly, while Asperger’s syndrome, a relatively mild 
neurological condition related to autism, may appear less biologically 
severe than paraplegia, an individual with Asperger’s syndrome may 
experience more significant socially imposed barriers in many 
employment sectors. Thanks to the universal design movement, which 
has improved architectural accessibility for persons with physical 
disabilities, many work environments pose greater obstacles to persons 
who have difficulty navigating complex social structures than to persons 
with mobility limitations. In addition, corporate incentives to achieve 
visible diversity in the workforce may motivate employers to prefer 
persons with mobility limitations and other physically obvious 
disabilities. Comparatively, employers have little incentive to hire 
persons with less obvious disabilities whose disability-related traits are 
more likely to elicit negative responses from fellow employees.8  
The ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, 
would appear to be the natural vehicle to address employment decisions 
that single out persons with uniquely stigmatized disabilities for 
negative treatment. Nonetheless, plaintiffs with the most stigmatized 
disabilities face difficulty using the ADA to challenge negative 
treatment they experience.9 In part, this difficulty arises from the 
ADA’s built-in limitations on employers’ obligations to reshape the 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. § 4(a)(3)(A). 
 7. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 
272 (2000) (“For many years, research has also consistently shown that people with psychiatric 
disabilities are subject to more severe employment discrimination than people with other kinds 
of disabilities.”) (citing Marjorie Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, in 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 1997, at 37, 37–52; Edward H. Yelin & Miriam G. 
Cisternas, Employment Patterns Among Persons with and Without Mental Conditions, in 
MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 25, 35 (Richard J. Bonnie & John 
Monahan eds., 1997) [hereinafter MENTAL DISORDER]; Sue E. Estroff et al., “No Other Way to 
Go”: Pathways to Disability Income Application Among Persons with Severe, Persistent Mental 
Illness, in MENTAL DISORDER 55, 60). 
 8. Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. 
L.J. 187 (2009). 
 9. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 273 (“[A]n examination of both reported cases and 
research supports the conclusion that people with psychiatric disabilities have received minimal 
benefit from the ADA’s protections against employment discrimination.”). 
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workplace to include individuals with disabilities—i.e., the “reasonable 
accommodation” and “undue hardship” provisions.10 Both of these 
provisions allow employers to use cost concerns to justify their refusal 
to make disability-related adjustments to the workplace.11 However, 
these limitations on employers’ accommodationary responsibilities 
cannot explain all the difficulties persons with the most stigmatized 
disabilities face in ADA litigation. These persons—many of whom have 
mental and psychological disabilities—often do not need expensive 
modifications to the employer’s physical facilities; instead, these 
workers more often simply require supervisors and co-workers to look 
past the stigma associated with their disability.12  
The more direct obstacle to individuals with the most stigmatized 
disabilities is courts’ reluctance to embrace intraclass disability 
discrimination claims.13 Although rarely acknowledged in the 
employment discrimination literature, many courts initially confronted 
with the ADA, and § 504, the statutory precursor to the ADA, refused to 
characterize disability-motivated termination decisions as 
discriminatory unless the employer replaced the terminated employee 
with a nondisabled person.14 These courts regarded the identification of 
a nondisabled comparator as not merely helpful, but essential to 
establishing a disability discrimination claim. Accordingly, an employer 
could often avoid liability for a disability-motivated termination 
decision by replacing the terminated employee with another member of 
the ADA’s protected class. Today, although many courts have wholly or 
partially abandoned the requirement that ADA plaintiffs identify a 
comparator outside the ADA’s protected class, many courts continue to 
                                                                                                                     
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)–(10) (2006). 
 11. Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
 12. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 274 (“[I]n the traditional form of discrimination 
claim, . . . the employee is not asking for accommodations but simply to be treated the same as 
everyone else. Many people with psychiatric disabilities, and most whose claims are based on 
perceived psychiatric disabilities, fall into this category.”). The more formidable obstacle to 
discrimination claims by persons with the most stigmatized disabilities—the restricted scope of 
the ADA’s protected class—was removed by ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-
325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Prior to the amendments, courts barred many persons with 
mental and psychological disabilities from the ADA’s protected class because their medications 
reduced the “substantial limitation” they would otherwise experience. The amendments, 
however, rejected this overly literal interpretation of the ADA’s text and thus brought into the 
ADA’s protected class many persons with pharmacologically treatable, but nonetheless 
stigmatized, conditions such as bipolar disorder, depression, and epilepsy. Id.  
 13. Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by 
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 194 (2009) (noting that the general phenomenon of courts 
assessing the presence or absence of a comparator in discrimination cases, “though scarcely 
invisible, has received little attention”). 
 14. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits recipients of federal funds 
from discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
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limit intraclass disability discrimination claims by requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that their disabilities are more biologically severe than the 
disabilities of persons who received more favorable treatment. 
To date, disability scholars have not focused on problem of courts 
limiting intraclass claims, perhaps due to the relatively limited number 
of intraclass discrimination claims.15 The 2008 amendments’ expansion 
of the ADA’s protected class, however, makes intraclass disability 
discrimination claims more salient. By bringing a broader range of 
individuals into the ADA’s protected class—including a large number 
of persons whose disabilities are less biologically severe—the 
amendments increase opportunities for employers to choose amongst 
members of the ADA’s protected class.16 Similarly, the amendments’ 
expansion of the number of persons able to sue under the ADA will 
increase the number of employees and prospective employees who will 
consider filing intraclass claims.  
The manner in which courts deal with the oncoming wave of 
intraclass disability discrimination claims will reveal a great deal about 
the extent to which courts have abandoned the welfare model of 
disability policy in favor of the civil rights model that aligns the ADA 
with traditional civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The welfare model of disability policy gives priority to 
persons with biologically severe disabilities, based on the assumption 
that disability policy should compensate for biological limitations. It 
also emphasizes maximizing aggregate benefits to “the disabled” as a 
class even when doing so disadvantages persons with the most 
stigmatized disabilities. 
A civil rights model, by contrast, focuses on the socially-imposed 
obstacles faced by people with disabilities and attempts to remove those 
obstacles. It emphasizes an individual’s right to be free from disability-
based animus, unnecessary paternalism, and harmful stereotypes.17 
                                                                                                                     
 15. The notable exception is Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly 
Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 859−61 (2002), 
(collecting cases). Cf. Cox, supra note 8, at 214–17 (raising the issue briefly). 
 16. Although the ADAAA codifies judicial conclusions that the ADA does not permit 
“reverse discrimination” suits by persons who claim that they were “subject to discrimination 
because of [their] lack of disability,” the ADAAA says nothing about whether persons who fall 
within the ADA’s protected class can challenge employers’ decisions to disadvantage them 
because of their relatively lesser disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, § 6(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill 
prohibits reverse discrimination claims by disallowing claims based on the lack of 
disability. . . .”).  
 17. See Cox, supra note 8, at 190–93 (describing the competing civil rights and welfare 
models of disability policy that have defined the debate surrounding the interpretation of the 
ADA). 
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The civil rights model suggests that the ADA’s purpose is not to 
provide preferential treatment to individuals with the most biologically 
severe disabilities, but is instead to challenge disability animus and to 
remove socially imposed barriers to persons with disabilities. While a 
welfare model—embodied in legislation such as the Social Security 
Disability program—might reasonably prioritize benefit allocations to 
individuals whose disabilities are the most biologically severe, the ADA 
should not enshrine a similar preference for biological severity. 
Litigation under the ADA should focus on disability animus and 
stereotypes rather than the biological severity of various disabilities. 
Accordingly, the ADA should account for the possibility that an 
employer who refuses to hire an individual with Asperger’s syndrome 
in favor of a less qualified wheelchair user may have engaged in 
disability discrimination even though the wheelchair user possesses a 
more biologically severe disability. Just as the historical bar on 
intraclass disability discrimination claims obscured the negative social 
responses to disability that the civil rights model emphasizes, courts’ 
current focus on the biological severity of disabilities also obscures 
negative social responses to disabilities.  
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I identifies the primary 
rationale for courts’ initial reluctance to permit intraclass claims: the 
ADA’s limited protected class. Courts emphasized that, unlike Title 
VII, which prohibits race and sex discrimination against every 
employee of a covered employer, regardless of the employee’s race or 
sex, the ADA prohibits disability discrimination only against the 
members of the ADA’s protected class. Focusing on the language that 
then defined the ADA’s protected class—individuals who possess “a 
substantial limitation upon one or more of [their] major life 
activities”—courts concluded that the ADA prohibited discrimination 
only between persons who fell within that definition and those that fell 
without it. In 1996, however, the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the other federal statute 
with a limited protected class, deflated this “limited protected class” 
rationale for restricting intraclass claims under the ADA. With the 
“limited protected class” rationale now discredited, Part II argues that 
courts’ continued resistance to intraclass disability discrimination 
claims stems from a welfare model justification: the belief that the ADA 
should maximize aggregate benefits to the ADA’s protected class as a 
whole even when it disadvantages persons with the most stigmatized 
disabilities. Part II also argues that, although courts may regard the 
ADA as encompassing a continuum of individuals whose disabilities 
range from more to less biologically severe, courts should not conclude 
that the ADA prohibits intraclass discrimination only in situations 
where employers disfavor persons with disabilities that are more 
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biologically severe. The ADA’s text indicates that the ADA is not 
solely concerned with the biological severity of individuals’ disabilities; 
instead, the statute is targeted to address “restrictions and limitations,” 
“unequal treatment,” and “stereotypic assumptions,”18 or, in other 
words, socially imposed difficulties to persons with disabilities.  
I.  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “LIMITED PROTECTED CLASS BARRIER” TO 
INTRACLASS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
A.  Courts’ Traditional Refusal to Allow Intraclass Claims 
In the first two decades of disability discrimination litigation, many 
courts held that the ADA categorically barred intraclass claims. These 
courts regarded the identification of a nondisabled comparator as not 
merely helpful, but essential, to establish a disability discrimination 
claim. They broadly concluded that the ADA only prohibits policies and 
practices that disadvantage “the disabled” vis-à-vis “the nondisabled.”19 
                                                                                                                     
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006). 
 19. Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting “the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act permit preferential treatment between disabilities”); Parker v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act, 
prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled.”); Brennen v. Comptroller 
of N.Y., No. 95-7559, 1996 WL 19057, at * 1 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (“To state a claim under 
the ADA, plaintiffs must allege that defendants treated them differently from non-disabled 
employees, or that defendants’ practices have a disparate impact upon disabled employees 
relative to non-disabled employees. . . . At bottom . . . plaintiffs are claiming that the defendants 
are discriminating among disabled persons. Like the Rehabilitation Act, however, whose case 
law we may look to for guidance . . . the ADA does not proscribe such conduct.”) (emphasis 
added); Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Section 504 
proscribes discrimination between the nonhandicapped and the ‘otherwise qualified’ 
handicapped.”); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[W]e have serious doubts 
whether Congress intended § 504 to provide plaintiffs with a claim for discrimination vis-à-vis 
other handicapped individuals . . . .”); Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 985 F. Supp. 
635, 639 (D.S.C. 1997) (“[T]he ADA proscribes only discrimination between the disabled and 
the non-disabled. The gravamen of Rogers’ claim, discrimination between individuals with 
different disabilities, is not governed by the ADA.”); Rome v. MTA/N.Y. City Transit, No. 97-
CV-2945, 1997 WL 1048908, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997) (“In order to establish a claim of 
discrimination under the ADA, plaintiffs must show that they have been treated differently than 
similarly situated non-disabled persons. Merely distinguishing among disabilities does not 
constitute discrimination under the ADA.”); Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
386, 391 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (“[T]he ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply only to discrimination 
between or among disabled and non-disabled persons.”); Wolford v. Lewis, 860 F. Supp. 1123, 
1134 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (stating that § 504 requires “only that disabled individuals receive the 
same treatment as those who are not disabled”); People First of Tenn. v. Arlington 
Developmental Ctr., 878 F. Supp. 97, 101 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (“Plaintiffs are claiming, inter 
alia, that some Arlington residents are being excluded from community services, because of the 
severity of their retardation or physical disabilities, but that other handicapped persons are 
receiving such services. However, an action asserting that certain plaintiffs have been the victim 
of discrimination vis-a-vis other handicapped people must fail because § 504 does not cover 
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Reasoning that “[i]t is not a violation of [§ 504 or the ADA] to 
differentiate among applicants [based on] attributes of 
handicap, . . . severity of handicap, . . . or level of handicap,”20 these 
courts repeatedly rejected intraclass discrimination claims, informing 
plaintiffs that they “cannot use the ADA to complain about a disparity 
in treatment among individuals with different disabilities.”21 
Based on this determination, many lower courts concluded that 
public and private entities that exclusively serve persons with 
disabilities could never violate disability nondiscrimination mandates 
because such agencies did not serve persons without disabilities.22 For 
example, in a case involving a New York disability agency, the Second 
Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s claims under § 504 and the ADA 
were “beyond tenuous given [the agency]’s sole purpose in assisting the 
disabled.”23 Accordingly, until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring,24 many state facilities that 
institutionalized persons with disabilities evaded challenges to their 
terms and conditions of confinement by emphasizing that the facility 
only institutionalized persons with disabilities.25  
Courts’ refusal to permit intraclass disability claims also 
                                                                                                                     
discrimination among similarly handicapped persons . . . . Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims under 
the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are dismissed.”); Cramer v. Florida, 885 F. Supp. 
1545, 1551 (Fla. 1995) (concluding that “the ADA applies only to discrimination against 
disabled persons compared to non-disabled persons”). 
 20. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 859 F. Supp. 776, 782, (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated 
on other grounds, 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(a) (2006). 
 21. Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd. 149 F.3d 453, 457−58 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 22. See, e.g., Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 
679, 697−99 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that “because Dr. Freilich has alleged only a difference in 
the way oversight and quality assurance is provided among hospital patients (who are arguably 
all disabled), she fails to make the showing, as the statutes require, that the treatment of the 
dialysis patients involves any difference in treatment between the disabled and the non-
disabled”). 
 23. Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 24. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 25. The courts’ pre-Olmstead understanding of the ADA and § 504 as prohibiting only 
disparate treatment between persons within and without the statutes’ protected class 
understandably provided state governments an incentive—directly contrary to the ADA’s 
nonsegregation objective—to segregate disability service facilities and programs from service 
agencies that served other populations. See, e.g., People First of Tenn. v. Arlington 
Developmental Ctr., 878 F. Supp. 97, 101 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that 
“some Arlington residents are being excluded from community services, because of the severity 
of their retardation or physical disabilities, but that other handicapped persons are receiving such 
services” with the explanation that “an action asserting that certain plaintiffs have been the 
victim of discrimination vis-à-vis other handicapped people must fail because § 504 [and the 
ADA] does not cover discrimination among similarly handicapped persons”).  
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significantly limited the scope of disability discrimination litigation in 
employment settings. Many courts concluded that to prove disability 
discrimination in a termination case, a plaintiff must show that “he or 
she was replaced by a non-disabled person,”26 a showing that employers 
could easily foreclose by replacing the plaintiff with another member of 
the ADA’s protected class.27 For example, the District Court of the 
Eastern District of Michigan concluded that a plaintiff with a disability 
had “failed to allege any discriminatory event” when her employer 
offered her desired job to another person with a disability.28 Even 
though the sole issue before the court was whether the plaintiff had 
alleged sufficient facts in her EEOC complaint to toll the applicable 
statute of limitations, a lenient pleading standard, the court reasoned 
that the plaintiff’s EEOC complaint could not satisfy this minimal 
requirement because the “plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination 
involves one handicapped person (the plaintiff) vis-à-vis another 
handicapped person.”29 Similarly, the District Court of the Southern 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Hancock v. 
Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if [the plaintiff] could somehow establish that 
she was disabled under the ADA, her claim would still fail on the grounds that she cannot point 
to a single similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more 
favorably.”); Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]o 
establish a prima facie case for discriminatory employment termination, the plaintiff must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . he was ultimately replaced by a person sufficiently 
outside the protected class to create an inference of discrimination.”) (reasoning later rejected by 
Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 356 (3d Cir. 1999)); Reiter v. Taylor Corp., No. 
97 C 3861, 1998 WL 801796, *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1998) (“Because Reiter has not made the 
most basic showing—that people whom NuArt continued to employ were not disabled—this 
Court cannot find that those outside the protected class, whether similarly situated or not, were 
treated more favorably than the protected employees. . . . [Accordingly,] Reiter’s prima facie 
case fails . . . .”); Kalekiristos v. CTF Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 654 n.12 (D.D.C. 
1997) (“[T]his Court, as many other trial courts have, shall include a fourth element to the prima 
facie case for disability discrimination: that the plaintiff was replaced by a non-disabled 
person.”); see id. at 664 (explaining that the plaintiff has “failed to prove that his replacement 
fell outside the protected class. In fact, the plaintiff repeatedly states he does not know who 
replaced him. . . . [T]he plaintiff also suggested the names [of] two people as his replacements, 
but he made no assertions regarding these persons’ abilities or disabilities. Needless to say, the 
plaintiff has failed to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case”).  
 27. See Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 395 (N.D. Iowa 1995) 
(noting that the practice of barring intraclass claims under the ADA effectively allows 
“employers to control whom the ADA protects”); cf. Howard v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 726 F.2d 
1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984) (inquiring whether an African American plaintiff’s “replacement by 
another black was a pretextual device specifically designed to disguise an act of 
discrimination”).  
 28. Fowler v. Frank, 702 F. Supp. 143, 146 (E.D. Mich. 1988).  
 29. Id. at 146 (“[The] plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination involves one handicapped 
person (the plaintiff) vis-à-vis another handicapped person . . . . [T]he Court cannot accept the 
offer of [the plaintiff’s desired job] to another handicapped employee as a valid discriminatory 
event, as contemplated under section 504. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to allege any 
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District of Indiana dismissed an ADA claim because the plaintiff failed 
to present sufficient evidence to establish that the individuals her 
employer treated more favorably lacked disabilities.30 Although courts 
in many circuits have since relaxed this categorical bar on intraclass 
disability discrimination claims, the Seventh Circuit, as recently as 
2008, opined that lower courts within its jurisdiction must dismiss ADA 
claims in which the plaintiff “cannot point to a single similarly situated 
employee outside the protected class who was treated more 
favorably.”31 
To justify limitations on intraclass claims, many courts cite Traynor 
v. Turnage,32 but this case does not actually support this restrictive 
reading of the ADA. In Traynor, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
longstanding statute, which denied to veterans with “primary 
alcoholism” a veterans’ disability benefit, was not repealed by 
Congress’s enactment of § 504, the statutory predecessor to the ADA.33 
The Traynor Court reasoned that the benefits statute, which dealt “with 
a narrow, precise, and specific subject, [was] not submerged by [§ 504, 
a] later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum, [because] 
the later statute [did not] expressly contradict the original act.”34 In 
explaining why § 504 did not expressly contradict the benefits statute, 
                                                                                                                     
discriminatory event.”). 
 30. Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. IP-99-0848-C-M/S, 2001 WL 396953, at *7 
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2001). 
 31. Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008). Relatedly, a larger number of 
courts continue to categorically conclude that the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate does not 
apply to employer-provided long–term disability plans or health insurance plans, even though 
the ADA’s text, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2006), provides that insurance plans may differentiate 
amongst disabilities only if the differentiation is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the 
ADA. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 150 (2d. Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the ADA bars intraclass disability discrimination challenges to insurance plans); Parker v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (opining, in a case challenging an 
insurance plan, that “[t]he ADA simply does not mandate equality between individuals with 
different disabilities [but instead] prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-
disabled”); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the 
ADA permits long–term disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental 
disabilities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99-384-P-C, 2000 WL 1186262, at *8 n.7 (D. Me. 
Aug. 2, 2000) (holding that the ADA permits long–term disability plans to differentiate between 
physical and mental disabilities). 
 32. 485 U.S. 535 (1988). 
 33. 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (1972). The applicable regulations, which excluded veterans 
from a waiver of a 10-year time limit for the use of an educational benefit, defined “primary 
alcoholism,” as alcoholism not directly caused by a psychiatric disorder. Venereal Disease, 
Alcholism, and Drug Usage, 37 Fed. Reg. 20,335-20,336 (Sept. 29, 1972) (to be codified in 38 
C.F.R. pt.3). 
 34. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 548 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 552 (“[I]t is by no 
means clear that § 504 and the characterization of primary alcoholism as a willfully incurred 
disability are in irreconcilable conflict.”). 
2010] DISABILITY STIGMA AND INTRACLASS DISCRIMINATION 439 
 
the Court noted that 
Congress is entitled to establish priorities for the allocation 
of the limited resources available for veterans’ 
benefits, . . . and thereby to conclude that veterans who 
bear some responsibility for their disabilities have no 
stronger claim to an extended eligibility period than do 
able-bodied veterans. Those veterans are not, in the words 
of § 504, denied benefits “solely by reason of [their] 
handicap,” but because they engaged with some degree of 
willfulness in the conduct that caused them to become 
disabled.35 
The Court further reasoned—in language that lower courts later 
quoted—that “the ‘willful misconduct’ provision does not undermine 
the central purpose of § 504, which is to assure that handicapped 
individuals receive ‘evenhanded treatment’ in relation to 
nonhandicapped individuals.”36  
Although this language led many lower courts to reason that § 504’s 
nondiscrimination mandate—as well as the ADA’s parallel mandate—
was limited to cases in which a plaintiff could demonstrate that she did 
not receive “evenhanded treatment” in relation to nondisabled persons, 
the exchange between the majority and dissenting Justices in Traynor 
reveals that the Traynor majority did not in fact endorse a categorical 
bar on intraclass disability discrimination claims. Instead, the exchange 
suggests that the Traynor majority believed that some policies which 
disadvantage persons with certain disabilities vis-à-vis persons with 
other types of disabilities would violate § 504.37 Responding to the 
dissenters’ argument that Congress lacked a substantial basis for 
concluding that primary alcoholism is always “willfully acquired,” the 
Traynor majority conceded that if the dissenters were correct—if there 
was in fact no “substantial basis” for treating alcoholics less favorably 
than persons with other disabilities—§ 504 would prohibit Congress 
from singling out alcoholics for lesser treatment.38 In other words, 
contrary to lower courts’ subsequent usage of the Traynor opinion, the 
Traynor majority acknowledged that § 504 indeed prohibited disability-
based discrimination amongst members of § 504’s protected class. The 
majority explained: 
It would arguably be inconsistent with § 504 for Congress 
to distinguish between categories of disabled veterans 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 549−50 (citations omitted). 
 36. Id. at 548. 
 37. Id. at 550. 
 38. Id.  
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according to generalized determinations that lack any 
substantial basis. If primary alcoholism is not always 
“willful,” as that term has been defined by Congress and 
the Veterans’ Administration, some veterans denied 
benefits may well be excluded solely on the basis of their 
disability.39 
Accordingly, the Traynor majority acknowledged that policies 
disfavoring persons with certain disabilities vis-à-vis persons with other 
types of disabilities would survive § 504 scrutiny only if the disparate 
treatment had a “substantial basis.”40 In other words, treating persons 
with specific disabilities less favorably than similarly situated persons 
with other disabilities could violate § 504 (and also, presumably, the 
subsequently enacted ADA).  
Given that Traynor did not require lower courts to prohibit intraclass 
disability discrimination claims, the lower courts’ prohibition of such 
claims starkly departs from their approach toward parallel race and sex 
discrimination litigation. Although a handful of courts initially 
suggested that race and sex discrimination statutes might require a 
terminated employee to prove that her employer replaced her with a 
person of a different race or sex, this reading of Title VII and § 1981 
was short-lived. In 1989, the Supreme Court made clear that replacing a 
female employee with another female employee would not immunize an 
employer from liability when gender stereotypes motivated the 
employer’s termination decision.41 Similarly, in 1987, the Supreme 
Court held that § 1981’s prohibition on race discrimination proscribes 
racial discrimination between persons who are members of the same 
race.42 This conclusion led lower courts to permit darker skinned 
African Americans to allege racial discrimination when employers 
discriminated against them in favor of lighter skinned African 
Americans (and vice versa).43 Thus, by the late 1980s, courts 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249-51 (1989); see id. at 250 (“In the 
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”). 
 42. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4, 613 (1987) (acknowledging 
that “[c]lear-cut [racial] categories do not exist . . . [and] that racial classifications are for the 
most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature,” the Court concluded that “a 
distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection”). Unlike Title VII, 
which prohibits national origin and color discrimination in addition to race discrimination, 
§ 1981 only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(2006); 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).  
 43. Curley v. St. John’s Univ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 181, 192−93 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[A] broad 
body of precedent recognizes that intra-group discrimination exists, especially against those 
with often-disfavored status within the group, such as the darkest-skinned among people of 
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consistently held that evidence showing that an employer relied on the 
plaintiff’s race- or gender-based characteristics in making an 
employment decision alleviated any need for the plaintiff to identify a 
comparator outside the plaintiff’s protected class.44  
In light of courts’ readiness to permit intraclass claims for race and 
sex discrimination litigation, courts’ reluctance to embrace intraclass 
claims for disability discrimination litigation is counterintuitive. In 
many ways it would seem that intraclass discrimination would be at 
least as much of a problem in the disability context as in the race or 
gender context. Just as employers may prefer employees whose race and 
sex characteristics conform to majority norms, employers may prefer 
persons whose disabilities are minor and elicit minimal negative 
responses from co-workers. In addition to the manner in which 
intraclass disability discrimination parallels race and sex discrimination, 
intraclass disability discrimination also reflects the scope of intraclass 
diversity, which is far more multifaceted for the ADA’s protected class 
than for race or gender categories. Unlike the relatively uniform genetic 
and phenotypic characteristics associated with specific races and 
genders, the only common theme across the ADA’s protected class is 
variation from the able-bodied norm. Accordingly, while it is often safe 
to assume that an employer’s attitude toward one Hispanic employee 
will be related to that employer’s attitude toward other Hispanic 
employees, it is more difficult to assume that an employer’s attitude 
toward a person with a physical disability like paraplegia is related to 
that employer’s attitude toward a person with a mental illness like 
bipolar disorder.45 
                                                                                                                     
color.”). 
 44. See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (“That one’s 
replacement is of another race, sex, or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but 
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition.”); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995−96 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (holding that a standard requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that he was replaced by a 
person outside of his Title VII protected class was “inappropriate and at odds with the policies 
underlying Title VII”); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting contention that “there can be no racial discrimination against a black person who is 
not selected for a job when the person who is selected for the job is black”); Jones v. W. 
Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that “proof that the 
employer replaced the fired minority employee with a nonminority employee is not the only way 
to create . . . an inference” of discrimination); cf. Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 486 (4th Cir. 
2005) (“[E]very other circuit has held that a Title VII plaintiff does not always have to show 
replacement outside the protected class in order to make out a prima facie case.”); id. at 488−89 
(internal citation omitted) (noting “replacement within the protected class does not always give 
rise to an inference of non-discrimination. One clear example of this is when the defendant hires 
someone from within the plaintiff’s protected class in order ‘to disguise its act of discrimination 
toward the plaintiff’. . . . [A]nother such category of cases is that wherein the firing and 
replacement hiring decisions are made by different decisionmakers”).  
 45. The conclusion that the ADA only prohibits discrimination between persons with and 
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B.  The “Limited Protected Class” Rationale 
In order to justify barring intraclass claims for ADA litigation while 
allowing them for Title VII litigation, many courts stressed the limited 
scope of the ADA’s protected class. They noted that unlike Title VII, 
which prohibits race and sex discrimination against every employee of a 
covered employer regardless of the employee’s race or sex, the ADA 
prohibits disability discrimination only against members of the ADA’s 
protected class.46 Focusing on the language that then defined the ADA’s 
protected class—individuals who possess a disability that “substantially 
limits one or more major life activities”47—courts concluded that the 
ADA prohibited discrimination only between persons who fell within 
that definition and those that fell without it.48 Based on this reasoning, 
the D.C. Circuit concluded that the ADA permitted employers to 
disfavor persons with specific disabilities “so long as [the employer] did 
not distinguish between [a condition] that ‘substantially limit[ed] one or 
more . . . major life activities’ and [a condition] that did not have such 
an impact.”49 
This analysis, of course, disregarded the history of disability-based 
discrimination, which indicates that the animus directed by an employer 
toward a person with a disability does not hinge solely—or often even 
primarily—on whether the person’s impairment arises to the level of a 
substantial limitation. Susan Stefan, an expert on mental disability 
discrimination, has noted that “[t]he depth of discomfort caused by the 
revelation that an individual has a mental illness is not related to any 
perception that the individual is substantially limited in major life 
activities.”50 Instead, Stefan explains, “[l]ike people who are HIV-
positive or have AIDS, the degree to which people with mental illness 
are limited in major life activities is largely irrelevant to the uneasiness 
                                                                                                                     
without disabilities also ignored the ADA’s “regarded as” provision, which permits individuals 
who are not actually substantially limited in a major life activity to sue for disability 
discrimination when their employer nonetheless takes adverse action against them on the basis 
of a perceived disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2009). This section of the ADA strongly 
suggests that the ADA is focused on addressing disability-based animus rather than on 
providing a benefit based on the biological severity of the plaintiff’s disability.  
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 706(8)(B)(i) (1994)).  
 49. Id. at 1061; see also id. at 1065 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[D]isparate 
treatment . . . between physical impairment on the one hand and mental impairment on the 
other . . . is permissible . . . because it is unrelated to disability, [which § 504 and the ADA 
define] as a substantial limitation upon one or more of a person’s major life activities.”) (citing 
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(i) (1994)) (emphasis added). 
 50. Stefan, supra note 7, at 273. 
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and fear the conditions engender in others.”51 Because disability-
specific animus is grounded more in discomfort and fear than in an 
individual’s degree of limitation, a person substantially limited in one 
major life activity, such as walking, may experience very different 
social responses than a person substantially limited in another major life 
activity, such as communicating. Nonetheless, many courts that 
prohibited intraclass disability discrimination claims in the 1980s and 
early 1990s appeared to infer from the limited nature of the ADA’s 
protected class that, for purposes of discrimination claims, all members 
of the protected class are identically situated. 
C.  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Erosion of 
the “Limited Protected Class” Rationale 
Many courts began to allow intraclass disability discrimination 
claims after the Supreme Court held in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corp.52 that intraclass claims were available under the ADEA, 
the other federal employment discrimination statute with a limited 
protected class.53 Resolving a case in which an employer replaced a 56-
year-old worker with a 40-year-old worker, both of whom were 
members of the ADEA’s protected class, the O’Connor Court sided 
with the many courts of appeal that had concluded that “[t]he fact that 
one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the 
protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his 
age.”54 Reasoning that “the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of age and not class membership,” the Court explained that “[t]he 
discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is discrimination ‘because of 
[an] individual’s age,’ though the prohibition is ‘limited to individuals 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 271–74. 
 52. 517 U.S. 308 (1996). 
 53. The ADEA’s protected class consists of persons “at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 631(a) (2006). 
 54. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996); see Roper v. 
Peabody Coal Co., 47 F.3d 925, 926 (7th Cir. 1995); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 
724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995); Kralman v. Ill. Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 155 (7th Cir. 
1994); Rinehart v. City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir. 1994); Lowe v. 
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1374 (2d Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Package 
Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1334–35 (1st Cir. 1988); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l, 766 F.2d 788, 
792 (3d Cir. 1985); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532–33 (9th Cir. 1981). But see 
O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
Fourth Circuit cases required plaintiffs to show that their replacement was outside of the 
protected class); La Pointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that Sixth Circuit precedent requires replacement by someone outside of the protected 
class); Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that a person 
alleging “that he was unlawfully discharged because of age must demonstrate . . . [that] a person 
outside the protected class replaced him”). 
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who are at least 40 years of age.’”55  
In O’Connor’s wake, many courts concluded that intraclass claims 
were also available under the ADA.56 For example, the District Court 
for the District of New Hampshire reasoned that because  
the ADEA is violated by hiring a forty-five-year-old over 
an otherwise qualified sixty-five-year-old based on 
age . . . [i]t logically follows that the ADA is violated by a 
policy that disadvantages schizophrenics based on their 
disability, despite the fact that individuals confined to 
wheelchairs are benefitted.57  
Similarly, the District Court for the District of New Mexico reasoned 
that just as  
                                                                                                                     
 55. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312–13 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (citations omitted); 29 
U.S.C. § 631(a)); see 517 U.S. at 312 (explaining that “[t]his language does not ban 
discrimination against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination 
against employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those who are 40 or 
older”). 
 56. See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc. 191 F.3d 344, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In a 
number of cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), we have expressed the fourth element of the 
prima facie case in a manner that might appear to require proof of replacement by someone 
outside of the relevant class . . . . But . . . we [have] rejected a defendant’s argument that an 
ADEA plaintiff must prove that he or she was replaced by someone outside of the protected 
class, a conclusion later ratified by O’Connor.”); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 
1173, 1185–86 n.11 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Given the somewhat unique characteristics of various 
disabilities, and the differences between individuals afflicted with a particular disability, 
replacement of one disabled individual with another disabled individual does not necessarily 
weaken the inference of discrimination against the former individual. . . . We do not believe that 
the plaintiff need necessarily establish that he or she was replaced by a person outside the 
protected class as an element of his or her prima facie case.”). 
 57. Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (D.N.H. 1999); see also 
Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 937 (N.D. Iowa 2000) 
(“Nor does exclusion of all persons with a specified disability, whatever the degree, from 
benefits provided to other disabled persons excuse discrimination by reason of that particular 
disability. The Supreme Court recently, and emphatically, rejected such a contention in 
Olmstead . . . . Thus, the County’s contention that there has been no discrimination by reason of 
Salcido’s disability, dementia, when all persons with dementia are excluded from services, 
cannot be sustained. Indeed, the County’s contention is as ludicrous as the suggestion that it 
wouldn’t be discrimination ‘by reason of race’ if all black persons were excluded from public 
services, but Asians and Hispanics were not excluded.”). Similarly, a pre-Olmstead district court 
opinion which was reversed on appeal relied on O’Connor to conclude that the ADA permitted 
intraclass claims. Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev’d, 
180 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 1999). Based on O’Connor, the court concluded that “the ADA 
must be construed to prohibit discrimination against individuals based on their specific 
disability, and not merely to prohibit discrimination that negatively affects the disabled as a 
class.” Id. at 1169.  
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the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone 
outside the protected class ‘lacks probative 
value[,]’ . . . . the fact that [the defendant] may have hired a 
blind or a deaf person, for example, lacks probative value 
on the issue of whether [the plaintiff] was discriminated 
against because of his disability.58  
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court also 
signaled that O’Connor’s reasoning applied to the ADA.59 Olmstead 
involved two women with mental disabilities who argued that their 
continued confinement in the psychiatric unit of a state hospital in 
Georgia violated the ADA because state treatment professionals had 
determined that they were eligible for a less restrictive placement in the 
community.60 The plaintiffs’ argument relied on Department of Justice 
regulations which concluded that the ADA prohibited “unjustified 
placement or retention of persons in institutions, severely limiting their 
exposure to the outside community.”61 The state countered this 
argument by invoking the traditional bar on intraclass disability 
discrimination claims.62 It argued that because the institution that 
confined the plaintiffs only served persons with disabilities, the 
plaintiffs could not prove disability discrimination.63 Sidestepping this 
argument to focus on the ADA’s “findings and purposes” provisions 
which suggested that unnecessary institutionalization could constitute 
discrimination on the basis of disability, the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs’ unjustified confinement violated the ADA.64 In response 
to Justice Thomas’s dissent, which echoed the state’s contention that 
disability discrimination claims required a comparator outside the 
protected class,65 the majority cited O’Connor and explained that 
                                                                                                                     
 58. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (D.N.M. 1998). 
 59. Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 60. Id. at 587–88. 
 61. Id. at 596 (citing 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998)). 
 62. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 896 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 63. Id. (arguing that “Title II of the ADA affords no protection to individuals with 
disabilities who receive public services designed only for individuals with disabilities,” and that 
the plaintiffs’ claims must fail because they had “not shown that they were denied community 
placements available to non-disabled individuals because of disability”). 
 64. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (“[D]iscrimination 
against the disabled persists in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization.”)). The majority 
also explained that “[w]e are satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of the 
concept of discrimination” in mind when it enacted the ADA. Id. at 598. 
 65. Id. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. (emphasizing that “community placement 
simply is not available to those without disabilities”); id. at 622 (opining that the majority’s 
conclusion that “it is sufficient to focus exclusively on members of one particular group” and 
permissible to conclude that “discrimination [has] occur[red] when some members of a 
protected group are treated differently from other members of that same group . . . is a 
remarkable and novel proposition”). 
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Justice Thomas’s “notion that . . . ‘a plaintiff cannot prove 
“discrimination” by demonstrating that one member of a particular 
protected group has been favored over another member of that same 
group,’ . . . is incorrect as a matter of precedent and logic.”66  
Despite the Court’s extension of O’Connor’s reasoning to ADA 
claims, some lower courts still refused to embrace its application to 
intraclass disability discrimination claims. For example, the District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that the  
argu[ment] that the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s decision in 
Olmstead v. Zimring altered the legal landscape [and] 
stands for the proposition that [an ADA plaintiff] can prove 
discrimination by showing different treatment of two 
members of the same class . . . is not 
compelling . . . [because] [d]isparate treatment of different 
disabilities was not at issue [in Olmstead].67  
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Maine rejected the 
argument that “disparate treatment between different categories of 
people within a protected class can amount to discrimination” because 
the relevant portion of the Olmstead opinion “constitutes dicta” and 
therefore “does not create new law to aid ADA claimants.”68 More 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 598–99 n.10 (majority opinion) (citing O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers 
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996)). The Court further noted that, even if the ADA’s definition of 
discrimination required reference to a comparison group, 
[d]issimilar treatment . . . exists in this key respect: In order to receive needed 
medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those 
disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given 
reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can 
receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice.  
Id. at 601; see also id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that if the plaintiffs “could 
show that persons needing psychiatric or other medical services to treat a mental disability are 
subject to a more onerous condition than are persons eligible for other existing state medical 
services . . . then the beginnings of a discrimination case would be established”); id. at 612 (“[I]f 
respondents could show that Georgia (i) provides treatment to individuals suffering from 
medical problems of comparable seriousness, (ii) as a general matter, does so in the most 
integrated setting appropriate for the treatment of those problems (taking medical and other 
practical considerations into account), but (iii) without adequate justification, fails to do so for a 
group of mentally disabled persons (treating them instead in separate, locked institutional 
facilities) . . . it would demonstrate discrimination on the basis of mental disability.”). 
 67. Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 68. El-Hajj v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30, 31 (D. Me. 2001); see also 
id. at 30–31 (“[S]everal courts specifically have found that Olmstead does not alter the validity 
of the line of cases holding that an insurer does not transgress the ADA by treating mental and 
physical disabilities differently.”); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 
1117−18 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Applying Olmstead to insurance classifications would conflict with 
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recently, the First Circuit, citing tension between Olmstead and an out-
of-circuit case which predated Olmstead, expressly declined to address 
an argument that a Title II violation would “occur if a public entity 
decided to make benefits available only to disabled individuals but then 
proceeded to distribute those benefits only to those disabled people who 
could access an administrative office on the second floor of a building 
lacking wheelchair ramps or elevators.”69 Similarly, in 2008, the 
Seventh Circuit opined, without discussing Olmstead, that courts must 
dismiss ADA claims in which the plaintiff “cannot point to a single 
similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated 
more favorably.”70 Accordingly, despite the erosion of the limited 
                                                                                                                     
the Court’s decisions in Alexander v. Choate . . . and Traynor v. Turnage, . . . which both 
endorse distinctions between types of disabilities . . . .”); Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper 
Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 697−99 (D. Md. 2001) (“[B]ecause Dr. Freilich 
has alleged only a difference in the way oversight and quality assurance is provided among 
hospital patients (who are arguably all disabled), she fails to make the showing, as the statutes 
require, that the treatment of the dialysis patients involves any difference in treatment between 
the disabled and the non-disabled.”). But see Johnson v. KMart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1052−54 
(11th Cir. 2001) reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated as moot, 273 F.3d at 1070 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead, a number of circuits had dismissed 
cognate claims challenging mental-health caps based on the rationale that the ADA ‘prohibits 
[only] discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled.’ . . . We conclude that these 
cases are undercut by Olmstead. . . . Olmstead leads us to the conclusion that K Mart’s LTD 
plan—which differentiates between individuals who are totally disabled due to a mental 
disability and individuals who are totally disabled due to a physical disability because of the 
given individual’s type of disability—appears prima facie to distinguish among beneficiaries on 
a basis that constitutes a form of discrimination contravening Title I of the ADA.”); Fletcher v. 
Tufts Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D. Mass 2005); Iwata v. Intel Corp. 349 F. Supp. 2d 135, 
149 (D. Mass. 2004) (“This Court agrees with the Johnson court’s analysis of Olmstead. Title I 
of the ADA prohibits discrimination amongst classes of the disabled.”); Hahn ex rel. Barta v. 
Linn County, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1054–55 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (“[T]he court must first address 
Discovery Living’s assertion that since it is a facility providing accommodations only to the 
disabled, Mr. Hahn cannot demonstrate that he suffered from disparate treatment compared to 
the non-disabled, as is required under Title III of the ADA. The Supreme Court recently, and 
emphatically, rejected this assertion . . . in Olmstead . . . . Thus, Mr. Hahn can set forth a claim 
of discrimination even if it is only between members of his protected class, namely, the 
disabled.”); Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 937 (N.D. Iowa 
2000) (“Nor does exclusion of all persons with a specified disability, whatever the degree, from 
benefits provided to other disabled persons excuse discrimination by reason of that particular 
disability. The Supreme Court recently, and emphatically, rejected such a contention . . . .”); 
Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (D.N.H. 1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has just rejected the argument that disparate treatment of different members of a protected class 
is not discrimination.”). 
 69. Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 175 n.10 (1st Cir. 2006); see id. (explaining that 
“[o]n this point, there is tension between [Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1998)] and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead”). 
 70. Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008). Relatedly, a larger number of 
courts continue to categorically conclude that the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate does not 
apply to employer-provided long-term disability plans or health insurance plans, even though 
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protected class rationale for prohibiting intraclass claims, the current 
scope of intraclass disability discrimination litigation remains unclear in 
at least two circuits. 
II.  THE FUTURE SCOPE OF INTRACLASS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIMS 
A.  The Lingering “Collective Welfare” Rationale 
Courts’ continued reluctance to permit intraclass disability 
discrimination claims after O’Connor and Olmstead may stem, in part, 
from a unique justification for prohibiting disability intraclass claims 
that courts have never applied to age, sex, or race discrimination 
statutes. Some courts have suggested that O’Connor’s reasoning, which 
makes clear that a limited protected class in itself poses no bar to 
intraclass discrimination claims, should not apply to the ADA because 
the ADA, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, should maximize aggregate 
benefits to its protected class.71 For example, in Modderno v. King,72 an 
influential opinion issued three weeks after the Supreme Court’s 
O’Connor opinion, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that § 504, the ADA’s 
statutory predecessor, did not permit intraclass litigation because, in the 
court’s view, such litigation could harm § 504’s protected class in the 
aggregate.73 In Modderno, persons with mental disabilities challenged a 
government employer’s health insurance plan that provided less 
comprehensive coverage for healthcare costs associated with mental 
disabilities than for comparable costs associated with physical 
disabilities.74 The plan imposed a stringent lifetime cap on mental health 
care expenses ($75,000) but no comparable cap on physical health care 
                                                                                                                     
the ADA’s text, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c), provides that insurance plans may differentiate amongst 
disabilities only if the differentiation is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA. See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 152–53 (2d. Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
ADA bars intraclass disability discrimination challenges to insurance plans); Parker v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (opining, in a case challenging an insurance 
plan, that “the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities 
[but instead] prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled”); EEOC v. 
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the ADA permits long-term 
disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental disabilities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., No. 99-384-P-C, 2000 WL 1186262, at *9 & n.7 (D. Me. Aug. 2, 2000) (holding that the 
ADA permits long-term disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental 
disabilities). 
 71. See, e.g., Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf. Lewis v. Kmart 
Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[R]eliance on O’Connor simply does not make 
intuitive sense.”). 
 72. 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 73. Id. at 1062. 
 74. Id. at 1060−61. 
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expenses.75 After acknowledging that “[p]erhaps mentally disabled 
individuals are more vulnerable to discrimination than the physically 
disabled,” the D.C. Circuit concluded that § 504 should nonetheless 
prohibit intraclass discrimination claims because “the disabled as a 
class—mentally and physically disabled individuals in the aggregate—
are better off under [a plan that disadvantages persons with mental 
disabilities] than under a plan in which mental and physical health 
benefits are each subject to a lifetime limit of $75,000.”76 Assuming that 
employers would respond to intraclass litigation by reducing the 
benefits provided to currently-advantaged persons, the court explained 
that “[w]e simply cannot believe that [§ 504,] a statute enacted for the 
benefit of the disabled, produces this result” of disadvantaging 
“disabled individuals in the aggregate.”77  
In effect, the D.C. Circuit prioritized the preservation of employer 
goodwill toward currently-advantaged persons with disabilities over the 
elimination of discrimination against other persons with disabilities.78 
This refusal to question why employers treat some members of § 504’s 
protected class less favorably than others is in tension with § 504’s (and 
the ADA’s) nondiscrimination mandate, which aims to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of disability. It also starkly contrasts with 
the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of employers’ attempts to use 
similar arguments under Title VII. Emphasizing that “[t]he principal 
focus of [Title VII] is the protection of the individual employee, rather 
than the protection of the minority group as a whole,” the Supreme 
Court has consistently concluded that Title VII does not “give an 
employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis 
of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the 
employees’ group.”79 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 1060. 
 76. Id. at 1062. The court’s assumption that the government would simply treat currently-
advantaged persons with disabilities worse in order to equalize the disparate treatment starkly 
contrasts with the Equal Pay Act, which expressly prohibits employers from “cur[ing] the 
disparity between male and female wage rates by lowering the male wage rate to the rate for 
females.” EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir. 1992); see Equal Pay Act of 
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994) (“[A]n employer who is paying a wage rate differential in 
violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the [nondiscrimination] provisions 
of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.”); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 
417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974) (“The objective of equal pay legislation . . . is not to drag down men 
workers to the wage levels of women, but to raise women to the levels enjoyed by men in cases 
where discrimination is still practiced.”). 
 77. Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062. 
 78. The court ignored the fact that prohibiting intraclass claims would serve to isolate the 
already marginalized employees with mental disabilities and further reduce their bargaining 
power for better health coverage.  
 79. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–55 (1982); see also id. at 455–56 (“Title VII 
does not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that he has not been 
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wronged because other persons of his or her race or sex were hired. That answer is no more 
satisfactory when it is given to victims of a policy that is facially neutral but practically 
discriminatory. Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment 
and practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”) (internal quotation 
omitted); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1979) (“A racially balanced work 
force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination. . . . It is 
clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for 
each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are 
already proportionately represented in the work force.”); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (concluding that fairness to the class of women employees 
as a whole could not justify unfairness to the individual female employee because “the statute’s 
focus on the individual is unambiguous”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 341–42 (1977) (noting that an employer’s treatment of other members of the plaintiffs’ 
group can be “of little comfort to the victims of . . . discrimination”); Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–45 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that a rule barring employment of all 
married women with preschool children, if not a bona fide occupational qualification under 
§ 703(e), violated Title VII, even though female applicants without preschool children were 
hired in sufficient numbers that they constituted 75% to 80% of the persons employed in the 
position plaintiff sought). 
Title VII case law also expressly conflicts with Modderno’s treatment of insurance plans 
that prioritize some members of the ADA’s protected class over other class members. Title VII 
case law indicates that just as insurance plans that provide more comprehensive coverage for 
Caucasians than for African Americans violate Title VII, insurance plans that provide more 
comprehensive coverage for the health care costs incurred by lighter skinned African Americans 
than for darker skinned African Americans would violate Title VII. Cf. Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983) (“[P]etitioner’s plan is 
unlawful, because the protection it affords to married male employees is less comprehensive 
than the protection it affords to married female employees.”); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that an employer violates Title VII if it 
fails to meet the “special or increased healthcare needs associated with a woman’s unique sex-
based characteristics . . . to the same extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare needs”); 
see also U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LAWS & GUIDANCE: DECISION 
ON COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-
contraception.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (concluding that an employer’s exclusion of 
prescription contraceptives from a health plan that otherwise comprehensively covered 
pharmaceuticals violates Title VII). 
By contrast, the ADA’s text makes clear that insurance plans need not provide equally 
comprehensive coverage to persons with disparate disabilities. Section 501 of the ADA, often 
termed the “safe harbor provision,” permits employers to maintain insurance coverage 
distinctions that produce unequal benefits to persons with different disabilities so long as the 
distinctions are not a subterfuge for disability discrimination, a standard that the EEOC has 
translated to simply require that the coverage distinctions be “actuarially justified.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12201(c) (2006); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, DIRECTIVES 
TRASNMITTAL: EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (2000), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/benefits.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009); see Mary Crossley, 
Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L REV. 73, 93−94 (2005) 
(“The thinness of this protection stands in marked contrast to the substantial protection provided 
by Title VII’s prohibition of race- and sex-based distinctions in employer-provided coverage 
regardless of any actuarial justification.”); Sharona Hoffman, Aids Caps, Contraceptive 
Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes’ Applicability 
to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2002) (concluding that § 501(c) “allows 
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Although in recent years, the discussion surrounding intraclass 
discrimination claims has focused largely on the O’Connor Court’s 
interpretation of the ADEA’s limited protected class rather than 
Modderno’s “aggregate benefits” analysis, many courts—both before 
and after O’Connor—have, in keeping with Modderno, assumed that 
while intraclass claims are available under Title VII and the ADEA, 
they are not available under the ADA.80 Perhaps these courts’ unstated 
rationale parallels the Modderno’s Court’s rationale: Disallowing 
intraclass disability discrimination claims will maximize collective 
benefits to the ADA’s protected class. Moreover, courts may implicitly 
assume that employers will be more receptive to hiring members of the 
ADA’s protected class when they know that courts will not evaluate 
their decisions to choose amongst members of the ADA’s protected 
class. Even though most employer decisions that require choosing 
amongst people with different disabilities will not violate the ADA, 
employers might prefer to know that all such choices—even those 
motivated by animus toward particular types of disabilities—will not 
trigger ADA scrutiny.  
While a higher employment level for the ADA’s protected class is 
obviously a laudable goal, Modderno’s aggregate benefits reasoning 
reflects a welfare-based model of disability policy that is in tension with 
the civil rights rhetoric that surrounded the passage of the ADA.81 By 
                                                                                                                     
employers to retain discriminatory insurance terms if they can prove a basis for them in sound 
actuarial principles”). While the safe harbor provision did not apply to the insurance plan the 
Modderno opinion discussed, many other opinions categorically held that the ADA bars 
intraclass claims, and did not acknowledge the safe harbor provision and its potential 
applicability to the case at hand. These courts bypassed § 501 to hold more broadly that the 
ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate encompasses no intraclass claims, an odd conclusion since 
§ 501 appears to be a special exception to the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate that Congress 
adopted as a concession to the insurance industry. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 
207 F.3d 144, 147 n.3 (2d. Cir. 2000) (concluding that the ADA does not encompass intraclass 
claims to long–term disability plans even though the plaintiff had argued that the specific plan at 
issue fell within the ADA’s safe harbor provision); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. 121 F.3d 
1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to discuss the ADA’s safe harbor provision and deciding 
that “[t]he ADA simply does not mandate equality between individuals with different 
disabilities [but instead it] prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled”); 
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to discuss the ADA’s 
safe harbor provision and concluding that the ADA permits long–term disability plans to 
differentiate between physical and mental disabilities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99-384-P-
C., 2000 WL 1186262, at *9 n.7 (D. Me. 2000) (holding that the ADA permits long–term 
disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental disabilities while explicitly 
declining to “reach the alternative arguments of MetLife and Allstate that . . . the Plan falls 
within the ADA safe harbor”). 
 80. See supra note 19 and cases cited therein. 
 81. The ADA was enacted amidst fanfare characterizing the statute as “a civil rights act 
for people with disabilities.” 135 CONG. REC. S4984, at S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) 
(statement of Sen. Lieberman). The Senators who introduced the ADA in 1989 expressly 
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accepting, rather than challenging, employers’ tendency to disfavor 
persons with certain disabilities, Modderno’s emphasis on the aggregate 
welfare of the ADA’s protected class limits the ADA’s capacity to 
address disability-based animus and to protect individual rights. It also 
undercuts the ADA’s standing as a civil rights statute that parallels Title 
VII. 
B.  Intraclass Claims by Persons Whose Disabilities Are Less 
Severe 
The welfare-based framework that Modderno and other courts have 
used to disallow intraclass disability discrimination claims also 
influences the many courts that permit such claims. To date, the courts 
permitting intraclass discrimination claims have done so primarily in 
situations in which a plaintiff alleges that he suffered discrimination 
because his disability is more biologically severe than the disabilities of 
individuals who received superior treatment. This practice suggests that 
some courts may continue to regard the ADA’s primary goal as 
improving the aggregate welfare of people with disabilities rather than 
eliminating disability discrimination.82  
                                                                                                                     
invoked the memory of the Civil Rights Act, describing persons with disabilities as a 
“minority” that has experienced discrimination and segregation analogous to that 
experienced by African Americans. Senator Kennedy championed the ADA as a design to 
“end this American apartheid.” 101 CONG. REC. S4979 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen. 
Kennedy); see also 101 CONG. REC. S4979 at 8507–14 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen. 
Kennedy and Sen. Harkin). 
 82. See Wagner by Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1016 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“[A] program barring all severely retarded persons from a program available to mildly 
retarded persons may be discriminatory.”); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 916 F. Supp. 
133, 140–42 (D. Conn. 1996) (noting that “under both statutes [the ADA and § 504], [covered 
entities are] prohibited from refusing to consider certain residents for possible community 
placement, merely based upon the degree of their disabilities”); Homeward Bound v. Hissom, 
No. 85-C-437, 1987 WL 27104, at *20–21 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987) (indicating that 
discrimination against persons whose disabilities are more severe violates § 504); Klostermann 
v. Cuomo, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that it would violate § 504 to treat 
mentally ill persons differently with respect to the provision of services based on the severity of 
their mental illnesses); cf. Plummer by Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 578 (8th Cir.1984) 
(“[W]e assume [without deciding] that the severity of the plaintiffs’ handicaps is itself a 
handicap which, under section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, cannot be the sole reason for 
[adverse treatment].”); Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268, 1278–81 (D. Conn. 1981) 
(suggesting obliquely that severity qualifies as a disability under § 504); see also Messier, 916 
F. Supp. at 141 (“[N]umerous courts have recognized that both Section 504 and the ADA 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of the severity of a person’s disability.”); Jackson by 
Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1298–99 (D.N.M. 1990), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that “[t]he severity of 
plaintiffs’ handicaps is itself a handicap,” such that “failure to accommodate the severely 
handicapped . . . while serving [their] less severely handicapped peers is unreasonable and 
discriminatory.”); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 214–15 (D.N.H. 1981) (“[T]he spirit of 
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The post-O’Connor ADEA case law has encouraged this trend. 
Since O’Connor, which prompted many courts to conclude that the 
ADA permits intraclass claims, the Supreme Court has clarified that the 
scope of intraclasss age discrimination claims only encompasses claims 
by older workers challenging preferences for comparatively younger 
workers. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,83 the Court 
held that although, read literally, the ADEA appears to bar all age-
motivated employment decisions, this prohibition actually extends only 
to employment decisions that disadvantage older workers vis-à-vis 
comparatively younger workers.84 In other words, a forty-five year-old 
has no ADEA claim when an employer decides, based on age, to 
replace him with a fifty-five year-old. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court noted that the word “age,” unlike the word “race,” clearly 
suggests a one-way continuum, such that “discrimination on the basis of 
age” does not encompass all forms of age-based decision-making.85 The 
Court also emphasized the ADEA’s limited protected class, reasoning 
that “[i]f Congress had been worrying about protecting the younger 
against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 
forty.”86  
This reasoning appears to have led some courts to conclude that 
Congress similarly did not intend to protect members of the ADA’s 
protected class with less biologically severe disabilities from 
employers’ decisions to favor persons whose disabilities are more 
biologically severe. For example, in an opinion issued soon after 
O’Connor, the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 
concluded that the ADA requires a plaintiff to show that he or she “was 
                                                                                                                     
the law is violated when certain [persons with disabilities] are afforded qualitatively different 
and better facilities than their more profoundly handicapped peers.”); Goebel v. Colo. Dep’t of 
Insts., 764 P.2d 785, 804 (Colo. 1988) (“[T]he failure to provide the more severely disabled 
persons access to services constitutes discrimination solely on the basis of particular handicaps, 
in violation of section 504.”). But see Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 692–96 (D.C. Pa. 1985) 
(suggesting that the severity analysis should apply in both directions).  
 83. 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 598 (“[T]he prohibition of age discrimination is readily read more narrowly than 
analogous provisions dealing with race and sex. That narrower reading is the more natural one 
in the textual setting, and it makes perfect sense because of Congress’s demonstrated concern 
with distinctions that hurt older people.”); see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be 
unlawful for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”) (emphasis added); id. § 631(a) 
(“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of 
age.”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 540 U.S. at 590–91 (“[T]he ADEA was concerned to 
protect a relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage of the relatively 
young.”). 
 85. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 540 U.S. 581, 598,  
 86. Id. at 591.  
454 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
replaced by a non-disabled person, one with a lesser disability, or one 
whose disability is more easily accommodated.”87  
Limiting intraclass claims in this manner, however, threatens to 
exempt some disability-motivated employment decisions from the 
ADA’s reach. While the replacement of a person with a disability by “a 
non-disabled person, one with a lesser disability, or one whose 
disability is more easily accommodated,”88 may often be good evidence 
of disability discrimination, replacement by a person with a greater 
disability or a disability that requires more costly accommodation 
should not necessarily prevent a terminated employee from 
demonstrating that disability-specific animus influenced his employer’s 
decision. Unlike age, which operates on a linear continuum, the term 
“disability” is far more variegated. Although disability-related welfare 
policies often regard disability as involving a severity-based continuum, 
sociological studies demonstrate that the social stigma and stereotypes 
surrounding various disabilities often do not correlate with biological 
severity.89 Mental disabilities, for example, often carry a far greater 
social stigma than physical disabilities, even when compared to physical 
disabilities that are more biologically severe and more costly to 
accommodate.90 
C.  Intraclass Claims and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
The ADAAA’s expansion of the ADA’s protected class underscores 
the ADA’s focus on addressing socially-imposed obstacles to persons 
with disabilities. Unlike the ADA’s original text, which limited the 
ADA’s protected class to persons substantially limited in a major life 
activity, the ADA now extends protected class status to all persons who 
possess a physical or mental impairment that is not minor or 
transitory.91 This change indicates that the ADA aims to prohibit all 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 394–95 (N.D. Iowa 1995); 
see id. (“[O]r, [in the alternative, that] the plaintiff was treated less favorably than non-disabled 
employees, those with lesser disabilities, or those whose disabilities are more easily 
accommodated.”); id. at 395 (“A plaintiff has been terminated ‘because of’ his or her disability 
just as surely where the employer terminates the plaintiff in favor of another who also fits within 
the ADA’s definition of ‘disabled,’ but whose disability is more cheaply or easily 
accommodated, as when the plaintiff is terminated in favor of an non-disabled person.”); see 
also Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1408–11 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Fink v. Kitzman, 
881 F. Supp. 1347, 1374–76 (N.D. Iowa 1995). 
 88. Hutchinson, 883 F. Supp. at 394–95. 
 89. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 273−74. 
 90. Id. at 272. 
 91. The ADA’s original text provided that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual on the basis of 
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). It defined disability as “a physical or mental 
impairment” that “substantially limits” one or more of an individual’s “major life activities.” Id. 
§ 12102(1)(A). The amendments, by contrast, provide more simply that “[n]o covered entity 
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forms of disability-based discrimination rather than to encourage 
preferences for persons whose disabilities are more biologically 
severe.92 Similarly, the amendments’ reinvigoration of the ADA’s 
“regarded as” provision, which permits individuals who do not have a 
physical or mental impairment to sue for disability discrimination when 
their employer takes adverse action against them on the basis of a 
perceived disability, strongly suggests that the ADA is focused on 
addressing disability-based animus rather than on providing a benefit 
based on the biological severity of the plaintiff’s disability.93 
The fact remains, however, that in addition to reducing the textual 
justifications for prohibiting intraclass disability discrimination claims, 
the ADAAA also makes such claims more likely. By bringing a broader 
range of individuals into the ADA’s protected class, the amendments 
will likely increase allegations that an employer refused to hire a 
plaintiff because of his disability and instead hired another member of 
the ADA’s protected class.94 
The manner in which courts deal with these claims will reveal a 
great deal about the extent to which courts have abandoned the welfare 
model of disability policy in favor of the civil rights model that aligns 
the ADA with Title VII. Courts adhering to a welfare model might point 
to the amendments’ codification of ADA case law which concludes that 
the ADA does not permit “reverse discrimination” suits by persons 
without disabilities claiming an employer treated them less favorably 
than disabled persons and thus “subject[ed them] to discrimination 
                                                                                                                     
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). However, the amendments 
further provide that a plaintiff who sues for a reasonable accommodation must still demonstrate 
a substantial limitation of a major life activity. Id. § 4(a). 
 92. In fact, the ADAAA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the 
amendments to bring into the ADA’s protected class many individuals with stigmatizing 
disabilities that are not necessarily the most biologically severe disabilities. The legislative 
history indicates that Congress was concerned that the ADA’s protected class encompass 
persons with disabilities that continue to carry a large social stigma—such as epilepsy, bipolar 
disorder, and depression—that may lead to disability discrimination in employment even though 
case law suggests that courts have not regarded them as severe, due to the availability of 
medication. H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 20 (2008). 
 93. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, at § 4(a).  
 94. Although the ADAAA codifies judicial conclusions that the ADA does not permit 
“reverse discrimination” suits by persons who claim that they were “subject to discrimination 
because of [their] lack of disability,” the ADAAA says nothing about whether persons who fall 
within the ADA’s protected class can challenge employers’ decisions to disadvantage them 
because of their relatively less severe disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, at § 6(a); see 
also H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill prohibits reverse discrimination 
claims by disallowing claims based on the lack of disability (e.g., a claim by someone without a 
disability that someone with a disability was treated more favorably by, for example, being 
granted a reasonable accommodation or modification to services or programs).”). 
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because of [their] lack of disability.”95 Courts might use this prohibition 
on reverse discrimination claims to reason that the ADA, like the 
ADEA, is only concerned about discrimination on a linear continuum. 
Courts should resist this impulse. Congress’ choice to prohibit 
“reverse discrimination” claims does not indicate that Congress 
intended to restrict the claims that members of the ADA’s protected 
class may bring against their employers. Similarly, Congress’ initial 
choice to limit the right to sue under the ADA to persons “substantially 
limited in a major life activity” does not indicate that Congress was 
concerned only about discrimination that disadvantages persons with 
more medically severe disabilities vis-à-vis persons whose disabilities 
are less medically severe. Instead, the ADA’s text indicates that 
Congress was concerned with “restrictions and limitations,” “unequal 
treatment,” and “stereotypic assumptions,”96—in other words, socially 
imposed difficulties that do not always strictly correlate with the 
medical severity of a disability.97  
CONCLUSION 
Due to the variegated nature of stereotypes and myths about different 
disabilities, the ADA should permit intraclass disability discrimination 
claims. While social welfare plans—such as Social Security Disability 
Insurance or even congressionally-crafted affirmative action plans—
might reasonably prioritize benefit allocations to individuals whose 
disabilities are more biologically severe, the ADA should not enshrine a 
similar preference for biological severity in employment. Such an 
emphasis on biological severity would inappropriately obscure the 
negative social responses to disability that do not necessarily correlate 
with a disability’s biological severity. 
                                                                                                                     
 95. The ADAAA provides that “[n]othing in [the ADA] shall provide the basis for a claim 
by an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because of 
the individual’s lack of disability.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, at § 6(a); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill prohibits reverse discrimination claims by 
disallowing claims based on the lack of disability. . . .”). Even before the ADAAA codified the 
ADA’s prohibition of reverse discrimination suits, the ADA’s limited protected class made this 
conclusion easy to reach as a textual matter because unlike Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” the ADA prohibited 
disability discrimination only against “individual[s] with a disability.” 42. U.S.C. 12112(a) 
(2006). But see Woods v. Phoenix Soc’y of Cuyahoga County, No. 76286, 2000 WL 640566, at 
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 18, 2000) (permitting a reverse discrimination suit to proceed).  
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006). 
 97. Id. 
